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Infuriated with the Infuriated?
Blaming Tactics and Discontent about the Greek Financial Crisis
by Dimitrios Theodossopoulos
The austerity measures introduced as a response to the recent financial crisis in Greece have inspired a wave of
discontent among local Greek actors. The latter declared themselves as “indignant” or “infuriated” with the austerity
measures. Their indignation, as I demonstrate in this article, has been expressed in terms of diverse arguments that
have either encouraged public protest or served as a critique of the protest in culturally intimate contexts. Here, I
argue that the critical local discourse about the austerity measures does not merely represent an attempt to evade
responsibility but a serious concern with accountability and the unsettling of moral community, which leads local
actors to pursue their own interpretative trajectories. The resulting interpretations, in all their diversity, and despite
the fact that they do not directly affect political decisions, provide local actors with a sense of discursive empowerment
against their perceived peripheralization.
It has been over a year since the world’s media “discovered”
the Greek debt crisis. During that time we have seen many
citizens in Greece disapproving of the financial restrictions
imposed “on their lives” by others: their government, Eu-
ropean Union (EU) officials, or the world’s financial estab-
lishment (to mention only some recipients of local blame).
A particular Greek adjective—aganaktisme´nos (indignant)—
has been put into use to describe the infuriation of many
ordinary citizens with those seen as responsible. The adjective
has grown to become a noun: the “indignants” (oi aganak-
tisme´noi) in Greece are those who challenge the proposition
that the nation’s citizens have to pay the cost of financial
mismanagement and corruption. The particular use of the
term “indignants” (plural) was inspired by protesters in Spain,
los indignados, who took the streets in 2011—often occupying
major squares—protesting against the measures taken by pol-
iticians, and more generally, challenging the “representa-
tional” authority of politicians.
In mid-May 2011, the Spanish indignados in the square of
Puerta del Sol, Madrid, voiced a public invitation that many
in Greece could not resist: “Don’t make so much noise, you’ll
wake up the Greeks,” cried out the Spanish protesters, re-
peating in a hushed tone, “Shh! Don’t wake up the Greeks!”
In previous work, and following Appadurai (1996, 2001), I
have highlighted how local peripheral actors imagine
themselves as part of a larger, international community of
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discontent (Theodossopoulos 2010), an “imagined com-
munity”—in Anderson’s (1983) terms—of the disenfran-
chised with politics, politicians, and “capitalism in its neo-
liberal, global manifestation” (Comaroff and Comaroff
2001). This type of discontent, despite its critical predis-
position toward globalization, is often communicated
through—and enabled by—the very media of globalization
(Theodossopoulos 2010), which sometimes inspire unex-
pected or antihegemonic political orientations (Gledhill
2010). The Spanish message to the Greeks was circulated
through television channels and Internet blogs, and the first
mobilization of the Greek “movement of the indignants” (or
Indignant Citizens Movement1) was organized through Face-
book.2 Its followers protested in major Greek squares but
primarily in Syntagma Square (Constitution Square), in front
of the Greek Parliament in Athens.
Many protesters in Greece chose to camp in Constitution
Square itself (from the end of May to the end of July 2011),
thus creating a physical manifestation of their “imagined”
community of discontent—one that the members of Parlia-
ment convening next door could not easily ignore: their
campsite was the starting point of dynamic protest but also
worked as a communication station, a forum of debate, and
space for socialization more generally (frequented by citizens
who did not necessarily participate in the protest). As with
the Spanish indignados, the Greek indignants espoused a pat-
tern of peaceful protest, unaffiliated with party politics and
critical toward the authority of politicians or their ability to
deal with the crisis. However, “the indignants in (or, of) the
1. Kı´nima Aganaktisme´non Polito´n.
2. Journalists reported that this was the first major movement of po-
litical protest to be organized through Facebook.
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square,”3 as they became known in everyday conversation,
were not alone in expressing discontent: an overwhelming
majority of Greek citizens, during the same period, claimed
that they were angry, outraged, infuriated—“exasperated” (see
Herzfeld 2011)—focusing (mostly) on the way the crisis was
handled by those in power, and (in some cases) with their
protesting fellow citizens, and the overall consequences of
austerity.4 “Indignation” soon developed to become a master
trope of protest in everyday conversation in Greece.
In this generalized context of discontent I discovered that
some Greeks citizens were critically predisposed toward—or
even infuriated—with their infuriated compatriots. Some of
them referred to themselves, with self-inflicted irony, as “in-
dignant with the indignants” (aganaktisme´noi me tous agan-
aktisme´nous) and clarified that they were equally outraged
with the crisis and its effects on their lives but upheld serious
reservations about the expressive infuriation (or lack of sys-
tematic political orientation) of their more vocal—“self-pro-
nounced infuriated”—fellow citizens. The resulting critique
of indignation at the local level included questions such as
“who had the right to appropriate the title of ‘the indignant’?”
or “who was justified to be more indignant than others?”
Reflections of this type led to the persistent reinterpretation
and reassessment of indignation in local conversation—a
practice reminiscent of Clifford Geertz’s observation that an-
thropological data are really “constructions of other people’s
constructions of what they and their compatriots are up to”
(1973:9).
In this article I capture ethnographically the local inter-
pretations of indignation (or infuriation) with the austerity
policy in Greece, including—to paraphrase Geertz above—
narratives of indignation with other people’s indignation, in-
terpretative accounts of the “etiology” of blame (Herzfeld
1992). My focus is not on the public manifestation of the
protest in and around Constitution Square but on the per-
ceptions of local actors, who talked—approvingly or dispar-
aging—about the role of Others (nation states, politicians,
protesters) in the particular crisis (and, in particular, during
May–September 2011). My aim is to shed some light on the
interpretative trajectories of ordinary citizens and their views
about accountability as these emerge in “culturally intimate
contexts,” where local actors do not hesitate to recognize
mutual embarrassments (Herzfeld 1997).
3. Oi aganaktismenoi stin (or, tis) platias.
4. Aganaktisi is generally translated in English as “indignation”; this
is the direct translation favored by most dictionaries. Herzfeld prefers
the term “exasperated” for its capacity to convey a sense of “being pushed
beyond the limits of one’s patience” (2011:26)—in Greek “eimai se apog-
nosi,” Panourgia (2011) stresses the term “rage” in her description of the
Greek protest (May-July 2011). The terms “outraged,” “exasperated,” and
“infuriated” can all translate in Greek as exorgismenos, exagriomenos,
ekneyrismenos, each term carrying its own subtle connotations. I have
prioritized in this article the term “infuriated,” as it better translates the
position of those Greeks who declared (in May–September 2011) to be
“infuriated with the infuriated” (aganaktismenoi me tous aganaktismen-
ous).
Unlike the simplified images of angry, protesting Greeks
promoted by the international media, local narratives of dis-
content in Greece reflect nuanced views, some of which en-
gage with a critique of the protest. Anthropology can make
an important contribution in making such views (and their
culturally embedded meaningfulness) visible (see also Hir-
schon 2012). As I will argue in the conclusion, local rhetorical
and interpretative tactics—in Greece and elsewhere—do not
merely represent an attempt to evade responsibility (which
they often do) but also a desire to reinterpret and renegotiate
responsibility and blame and assume in this process a small




Fifteen years ago Ortner (1995) observed an apparent lack of
ethnographic perspective in the anthropological treatment of
resistance. To a great extent her observation is still valid today:
anthropologists tend to prioritize their own explanations over
those of resisting subjects, analyzing resistance from above or
framing their discussions of resistance in terms of overex-
haustive historical or sociological contextualizations. As a re-
sult, publications about resistance, especially those in article
form, have very little space for describing the actual voices
and points of view of protesting local actors. This tendency
often results in the relative neglect of the local meanings of
resistance and the relegation of those meanings as folklore or
ethnography subordinate to theory (see Reed-Danahay 1993).
This article makes a small contribution toward remedying
this problem. My decision to focus on local interpretations
of indignation and protest in Greece—privileging local voices
of discontent—goes against this general trend of “interpretive
refusal” (Ortner 1995:188).
In the ethnographic presentation that follows, instead of
discussing the economic background of the debt crisis in
Greece—a symptom of a global-cum-European financial crisis
overanalyzed by economists, journalists, and political com-
mentators (adopting top-down perspectives)—I prioritize
(and provide space) for describing local interpretations of
discontent. I contextualize the latter by reference to ethno-
graphically informed accounts from the anthropology of
Greece, which pay attention, as I describe below, to localized
conversations about timely, wider (national or international)
events, highlighting the interconnectedness of local (periph-
eral) political discourse. My conclusion—which underlines
the empowering potential of local rhetoric and its complex-
ity—is once more interpretative in its orientation, and partial.
It represents an attempt to shed some light on the Greek
protest and invites—through this particular publication me-
dium—further anthropological commentary and debate.
The anthropology of Greece—the field of knowledge that
I use to contextualize the ethnography that follows—expe-
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rienced considerable growth and diversity in the 1990s (Pa-
pataxiarchis 2007) and provided us with detailed insights into
the constitution of modern-Greek national consciousness,
history, and identity (see, e.g., Brown and Hamilakis 2003;
Faubion 1993; Herzfeld 1987; Hirschon 2000, 2003; Just 1989,
1995; Stewart 1994; Theodossopoulos 2007a). It has also ex-
plained how the predominant Greek model of nationalism
has affected interethnic conflict, such as in Cyprus, for ex-
ample (Bryant 2004; Loizos 1981; Papadakis 2005; Sant Cassia
2005), or in the context of debates about Greece’s northern
borders (see, e.g., Angelopoulos 2006; Cowan and Brown
2000; Danforth 1995; Hart 1999; Karakasidou 1997). A result
of these studies, and many similar ones that followed, was
the deconstruction of identities previously taken for granted
and the acknowledgment of cultural diversity within the al-
leged homogeneity of the Greek-speaking world (Papataxiar-
chis 2006).
As the number of researchers working on the anthropology
of Greece increased in the late 1990s and during the first
decade of the new millennium, attention was also paid to how
local actors evaluate international politics, perceive their
neighbors in the southeast European periphery, and appraise
the role of the Great Powers in general (see, e.g., Brown and
Theodossopoulos 2000, 2003; Kirtsoglou 2006; Kirtsoglou and
Theodossopoulos 2010a, 2010b; Papadakis 2004; Sutton
1998). In this respect, the ethnographers of Greece gradually
started engaging with local rhetoric, with how individual ac-
tors in particular contexts talk about politics, history, and
ethnicity. This attention to local discourse brought anthro-
pology closer to the concerns of its respondents and provided
examples of analysis that diverge from the usual academic
proclivity to explain social phenomena in a top-down manner.
Everyday conversation in peripheral settings, such as the cof-
feehouse or the kitchen backyard, provided anthropologists
with a gateway for accessing local views about wide-ranging
events (see, in particular, Sutton 1998). As a result, the spon-
taneous, off the record, local political commentary, which is
exuberantly plentiful in Greece, received the deserved atten-
tion in anthropological analyses.
These interventions within the field rest upon the foun-
dations set by the work of Michael Herzfeld, who has metic-
ulously explored the interpretative threads of Greek political
rhetoric, often looking at arguments that address ordinary
and uneventful processes, the imponderabilia of political dis-
course in Greece. In The Social Production of Indifference
(1992), Herzfeld looks at the informality of bureaucracy, the
frustration of its victims, and the work of everyday stereo-
typing. He also discusses the excuses of Greek local actors
and their responsibility-evading tactics. These involve blaming
others for the shortcomings of the self, metaphorically or
literally. In the context of discussions about politics and his-
tory, for example, blaming other nations and, in particular,
the Great Powers, is a rhetorically persuasive tactic for ex-
onerating the failures of one’s own nation (Herzfeld 1982).
This etymology of blame, Herzfeld explains (1992), plays an
important role in the political theodicy of the Greeks—their
theorizing in search of explanations and meaning against the
injustice of bureaucracy, state affairs, and politics.
Herzfeld’s attention to the frustrations and explanatory tac-
tics of ordinary, everyday Greek actors represents a committed
anthropological attempt to acknowledge, and simultaneously
demystify, local political discourse in Greece. The strategic
attribution of blame, as this is rhetorically reenacted in con-
versation about politics, is a very good example of defensive
nationalism, an attempt by peripheral actors to justify—
within their own informal arguments—the official version of
history and portray Greece as the victim of other nations
(Herzfeld 1982, 1992). With irony, humor, and an astute po-
litical awareness, Greek local actors caricature national and
international leaders, draw attention to the irresponsibility of
the powerful, and often explain world politics in a manner
that vindicates others and exonerates themselves. Taking ad-
vantage of their own ambivalent position in respect to the
West, they are able to employ stereotypes held by Europe
about the Orient but also stereotypes used by non-Europeans
about the Occident (Herzfeld 1997).
From the point of view of many local Greek actors, ste-
reotyping Others is a successful and well-established blame-
evading tactic. In everyday political discourse stereotypes con-
stitute parts of arguments (Brown and Theodossopoulos
2004), used by the authors of those arguments to enhance
their self-representation (Herzfeld 1992), establish meaningful
categories, explain inequalities, and negotiate power (Theo-
dossopoulos 2003a). Seen from a context-oriented perspec-
tive, stereotyping—and faultfinding in the Other—can be seen
as a discourse that responds to fear, insecurity, and peri-
pheralization; it is not surprising, therefore, that it is such a
popular tactic among less privileged actors in the margins of
Europe (Theodossopoulos 2003a:178).
My use of the term “tactic” here alludes to de Certeau’s
distinction between strategies (of powerful institutions) and
tactics (of powerless local actors) but does not espouse de
Certeau’s individualized (or desocialized) view of resistance
as “rooted in a much more fundamental human nature” (see
Mitchell 2007:91). I rather see the tactic of blaming Others
in Greece as a culturally established discursive weapon, which
as Herzfeld (1992) argues, provides a culturally meaningful
narrative about what is unexplainable (and not transparent)
in the citizen’s relationship with the state. The relevance of
this tactic becomes apparent in the context of anti-austerity
protest, not only in the self-justification of the protesters in
the square but also in the discontent of those who are indig-
nant with other indignants.
Therefore, an approach that concentrates on local inter-
pretations and reinterpretations of the protest, and the rhe-
torical tactics these entail, provides a bottom-up perspective
to the complexity of local protest and has two additional
advantages: first, the focus on local views, rather than on
resistance itself, minimizes the danger of romanticizing local
resistance—a common drawback of resistance studies (Gled-
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hill 1994; Ortner 1995). The analyst, instead of producing an
apology for resistance, is forced to deal with (and appreciate)
its local complexity. Second, the focus on local interpretative
accounts discourages the pathologization of resistance. In-
stead of dismissing local protest as local anomalies—“prob-
lems of an irrational periphery” (see Gledhill 1999:201)—the
ethnographer is encouraged to treat local explanations as re-
positories of meaning.
As I stressed before, interpretative ethnography is modest
and inherently partial in its orientation. Without any doubt,
the ethnography that follows does not represent all available
views and all Greek “indignants”: such a generalization would
refute my emphasis on the complexity of indignation. Most
of the Greek “indignants” (or those “indignant with the in-
dignants”) with whom I spoke are working-class and middle-
class citizens in the town Patras, Greece, the site of previous
fieldwork carried out between 1999 and 2007.5 It was some
of them who insisted—aware of my interest in the poetics of
local discontent—that I should write about the recent “in-
dignation” of the Greeks. As in the past, they invited me once
more into their conversations (from June to September 2011)
and debated with me and other interlocutors, who were, like
me, born in Greece and Patras. Additional points of views
were collected from protesters in Constitution Square in Ath-
ens (during June and July 2011) but also through discussions
with friends in Athens and members of the Greek diaspora
in Panama (during April and May 2011), with whom I have
established close rapport since 2007. The provocatively in-
dignant views of the latter inspired my decision to write about
this topic, so they represent my departure point in this in-
vestigation.
The View from Afar: Greeks Not Working
Enough
You know very well, as I do, how life is in Greece. One
works for every ten who laze around. This is not the Greece
of our fathers. This is the Greece of plenty, the Greece of
Euro and privilege. But it couldn’t last forever. What do
you think? Someone has to pay for all this. It is payment
time! (62-year-old Greek migrant in Panama City)
For many Greek migrants in Panama the austerity measures
introduced recently in Greece represent a sense of poetic jus-
tice. The Greeks of Greece, their argument goes, have lived
in a state of affluence for the last 20 or 30 years, working
less, having more leisure, relying on subsidies—and bureau-
cratic machinations—to eat/swallow (na tron) European or
government money.6 This is a familiar rhetoric that prolif-
erates in more or less self-critical discussions in “culturally
5. This was fieldwork focusing on local views of, and discontent with,
wider political processes; see Brown and Theodossopoulos 2000, 2003;
Kirtsoglou and Theodossopoulos 2010a; Theodossopoulos 2004, 2007b.
6. The metaphor of eating is often used to indicate stealing, especially
by politicians or civil servants who steal from public coffers.
intimate” contexts in Greece or abroad, where Greek actors
feel safe enough to expose the embarrassments of their own
nation (Herzfeld 1997). I have heard a version of this rhetoric
in Panama City, Panama. In the culturally intimate company
of other Greeks, and while recuperating from fieldwork in the
rainforest, I shared with Greek migrants food—and nostalgia
(see Sutton 2001)—but, more importantly, passionate dis-
cussions about the latest news from Greece.
There was a surprising harsh tone in the critical views of
my Greek friends in Panama. The familiar rhetoric about
laziness and corruption in Greece was more unforgiving to-
ward laziness in particular, as it reflected the point of view
of men who sweat to earn a living, working hard away from
their country, deprived of comfort, but succeeding in ac-
quiring financial opportunities that Greece had previously
denied them. From their point of view, the Greeks living in
Greece do not work as much, and many do not work at all,
living on their parents’ money or government benefits. The
opinion of Greek-Panamanian friends is fueled by yearly visits
“back home” to a Greece that looks different: where a cup of
coffee costs 5 euros (or US$8), young men are rude and “sit”
in the cafeteria all day, civil servants are inefficient and lazy,
and so many people seem to be—in comparison to the work
ethic of the migrants in Panama—unaccustomed to hard work.
When I protested that not everybody in Greece is lazy, that
maybe the young who “sit” in the cafeteria are unemployed
(and cannot find work), that those who run their own busi-
nesses (or work in the private sector) have to deal with an
increasingly competitive environment, I was dismissed: “Yes,
maybe some (people) work more than others, but you know
what we mean: you also work abroad.” “The young in Greece
are spoiled, have (university) degrees, and don’t deign to work
in the jobs taken by Albanians.”7 Then my migrant friends
continued: “Yes, the owners of private business work, but the
civil servants don’t . . . everybody is a civil servant in Greece,
almost everybody”; “and everybody has a degree and an at-
titude, but not the mood for work.” “This is why they protest
now,” “they only know how to spend money and complain.”
I would have argued that these harsh views reflect an im-
plicit orientalism toward Balkans countries (Todorova 1997),
a dismissive attitude toward non-Western civilizational men-
talities—see, for example, Huntington (1996)—that repre-
sents a “culturalist,” ethnocentric perspective of the type I
have objected to in previous work (see Brown and Theodos-
sopoulos 2000, 2003). Yet, the views described above did not
intend to argue that laziness is an inherently quality of being
Greek. The authors of these views were Greek themselves,
migrants in a developing country poorer than Greece, where
they evidently work hard everyday. Their stained shirts, sun-
burned arms, and posture—relaxing after everyday work—
embodied a measure of comparison: “the Greeks in Greece
do not work that much! Not as much as we do!”
7. The Albanians here stand for all non-Greek migrants in Greece who
are prepared to undertake low-paid manual jobs.
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“Much of a rural Greek assessment of character centers on
how hard a person works,” argues Herzfeld, explaining that
a hard-working orientation toward life is not “the exclusive
preserve of Weber’s ideal-type protestant ethic” but is com-
mon in rural Greece (1997:134)—and I would add, in urban
working- and middle-class Greek contexts as well. This hard-
work ethic permeated the lives of an older generation of
Greeks who experienced poverty in the post-WWII years in
Greece and has captured the attention of the anthropologists
of Greece. The latter described this hard-working orientation
toward life as “agonistic” (Herzfeld 1985), a perspective iden-
tified elsewhere in south Europe (see Campbell 1964; Gilmore
1987; Peristiany 1965; Pitt-Rivers 1963).8 It resonates with a
perception of life as a continuous struggle (agonas) with the
land and the moral limits of oneself (du Boulay 1974; Dubisch
1995; Friedl 1962; Hart 1992; Kenna 1990; Theodossopoulos
2003b). In this rendering, work as struggle has cathartic qual-
ities and can be seen as a remedy to misfortune, a justification
for a morally good life;9 to many Greeks, Herzfeld explains,
“the attitudes that outsiders would call fatalism is really just
laziness” (Herzfeld 1992:134).
Seen from such an anthropological point of view, those
Greeks who criticize other Greeks as “lazy”—far from repro-
ducing a Western capitalist ethic or an orientalizing dis-
course—spearhead their arguments from the same agonistic
perspective that inspires the defiant stance of their protesting
compatriots. From the point of view of many migrant Greeks
in Panama, the Greeks in Greece protest in an orchestrated
attempt to maintain a wasteful lifestyle of consumption: the
word “waste” (spatali) was repeated several times through
these discussions in Panama. Instead of working hard to repair
the damage—as their grandparents had done in the 1950s—
the Greeks in Greece were accused for lacking moral character.
As I will describe in the following section, I recorded similar
arguments by mainland Greeks of conservative, but also left-
ish, inclinations. In what follows, I will complicate this view
further.
Infuriated with the Infuriated
You think that what we see today with the crisis is all bad.
I have seen much worse. I was a young man in the post-
war period. I remember the civil war and the poverty in
the 1950s. Greece has seen much worse. The young do not
know this. They protest because they are spoiled. (85-year-
old man in Patras, Greece, July 2011)
8. Here I am not attempting to defend the category of the Mediter-
ranean as a unit for analysis, which represents, as Goddard, Llobera, and
Shore (1994) have suggested, an invented analytical construct. Never-
theless, the similarities between the Spanish and Greek versions of in-
dignation, and the ease with which the Spanish idiom of protest was
translated into Greek, deserve further analysis.
9. Which, in turn, is subjected to vigilant social control through gossip,
which encourages a constant underplay of individual success (see du
Boulay 1974; Just 2000).
I have already discussed how a particular working ethos in-
forms a critical perspective toward protest in Greece. The
“myth” that the Greeks (in Greece) do not work (enough) is
paradoxically maintained by many Greeks in Greece who
work (or have worked throughout their lives) very hard. These
can be pensioners (such as the man in the opening quotation
above), established small-businessmen, employees in the pri-
vate sector, but also civil servants in “demanding” services
who compare themselves with colleagues in less demanding
services. In all these respects, evaluations about how much
one works (or should work) are always comparative: the el-
derly tend to measure prosperity through reference to the
decades following the war,10 the small-businessmen by weigh-
ing their investments in personal labor, and the private sector
employees by comparing their job insecurity with the security
and relaxed working ethos of (many) civil servants.
These comparisons often fuel resentment, which culmi-
nates—and is articulated more explicitly—in times of crisis.
Many Greeks in Patras, for example, maintain that their fellow
citizens who complain passionately in public about the aus-
terity measures are serving their personal or trade-union in-
terests (prosopika or syntehniaka symferonta). The public and
often dramatic tone of the protesters is negatively criticized
by equally dissatisfied citizens from the backstage. The latter
see the most vocal protesters as self-serving, their rhetoric
intended to provoke excitement, a type of rhetorical sensa-
tionalism (entiposiasmos). They express, therefore, a more
conservative dimension of discontent, which diverges from
“the rhetoric of the square” in tone and perspective.
Who are these “indignant” critics of “the indignants”? Are
they simply those who are politically conservative or more
directly affiliated with the political right? It is true that several
among the Greeks who are agitated with their most vocal
(protesting) compatriots tend to be middle-aged or older,
wealthier, and affiliated with the conservative or (the center
wing of) the Socialist Party. In Patras, however, I met several
leftists, even supporters of the Communist Party, who were
critical toward “the protesters in the square” and the direction
of their protest. One of them, a communist, focused in the
perceived lack of organized political strategy in the movement
of the indignants: “I see only confusion. . . . I don’t see a
vision of resistance; I don’t see a program and political ar-
guments.” A supporter of one of the smaller leftist parties11
argued that the indignants who are in the streets “monopo-
lize” the issue of indignation: “I am infuriated too,” he said
with pointed irony (and without specifying about what, as he
10. Here reference to an idealized past sustains the moral authority
of those who can nostalgically evoke it. This is a good example of Herz-
feld’s (1997) notion of “structural nostalgia”: a static past of balanced
sociality sets the standards of legitimate arguments in a less perfect (or
sociable) present.
11. DIMAR (Democratic Left), is a party that grew substantially—
both in support and numbers—prior to the elections of May 2012, the
results of which became known after completing the final revisions of
this article.
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was infuriated with the general circumstances and the pro-
testers), “they are not more infuriated than me!”
The voices I have presented so far highlight the complexity
of discontent in Greece. Subtle or more serious disagreements
have inspired a few individuals with leftist inclinations to
differentiate their position from the public expression of the
protest or, in some cases, dissociate themselves from it. In
this respect, their critical arguments meet in everyday con-
versation the arguments of (relatively more) conservative in-
terlocutors, who criticize the form and direction of the pro-
test. When the protest culminates in violence and civil unrest,
older or more conservative citizens challenge the need for the
protest itself—although, I should stress once more, they also
declare themselves “indignant” with the overall situation—
arguing that the protesters are protesting for the sake of pro-
test, “without an awareness of the seriousness of the situa-
tion.”
When the protesters in Constitution Square passionately re-
jected the austerity measures proposed by the government,
there were several men and women in Patras who—despite
their unhappiness with the measures themselves—expressed the
view that there was “no other way”: “if those measures do not
pass, those in the square will not have salaries or benefits to
‘eat’ next month.” Arguments of this type were voiced by those
supporters of the then-ruling Socialist Party and the Con-
servative Party that initially rejected the austerity measures
(only later to support them as inevitable). A committed con-
servative supporter, a retired woman in her sixties, admitted
that her party rejected the austerity measures as an “oppo-
sition tactic,” but if her party was indeed in power, they would
have implemented very similar procedures; she further ex-
plained:
The people do not believe the numbers presented by the
government. Why should we believe them? The politicians
have been telling us lies for so many years. But now the
situation is bad, and there is no other solution. We will have
austerity, in this or another way[: whichever political party
is in power].
On June 29, 2011, when these particular measures were voted
in by the Parliament, and the protesters in Constitution Square
exploded in outrage, some critics in Patras commented nega-
tively about the public demonstration of insubordination:
But the Greeks do not understand the seriousness of the
(financial) situation. They think that they can blackmail
Europe to donate us the borrowed money! They say: If you
do not erase our loan you will drown with us! But is this
serious?
Here the agitation of those who are unhappy with the Indig-
nant Citizens Movement is related to the rhetoric of defiance
espoused by the protesters. The politics of “we won’t pay,” I
was told, is based on the argument that a potential Greek
bankruptcy will make the euro economy unviable, and the
European Union has no other option than to bail Greece out
or, ideally, to erase a portion of the Greek debt. A few re-
spondents in Patras, mostly conservative in their affiliation,
referred to this expectation as unrealistic, while a left-leaning
friend pointed out that it is based on the principles of “black-
mail.” A supporter of the governing (Socialist) party ex-
claimed after elaborating on a similar theme: “Who will take
us seriously with the policy of the rebel? They will throw us
out of Europe!”
For many among the critics of the indignants, who are
indignant themselves with the austerity measures, an addi-
tional problem is the “public exhibition of inappropriate (for
a European nation) behavior in Constitution Square.” As
Herzfeld (1997) has theoretically clarified, in Greece there is
a profound ambivalence—a disemia—between public self-
presentation (which is expected to be in line with Greece’s
classic and European heritage) and private introspection
(which relates to less Western, intimate identities). In the
context of the protest in and around Constitution Square,
many Greeks felt offended by what they interpreted as a vi-
olation of the nation’s representation. A 53-year-old high
school teacher, supporter of the Socialist Party, and mother
of a daughter (who had joined the protest in the square),
encapsulated this as follows:
I am embarrassed by the image of the square. The day before
yesterday I went to Athens and I saw them . . . early in the
morning. It was like a gypsy encampment, and there were
many low cost plastic and metal objects (tzitzalomatzala),
Tupperware and young men wearing swimming trunks and
underwear. All this in front of the hotels, the tourists, the
parliament. This is not indignation, this is embarrassment.
What image should we show to the world?
Reflecting on the theme of embarrassment, a left-leaning doc-
tor in his early forties confided to me in dismay:
What hurts me is that they break the marble [of the pave-
ments] and make the city naked. Marble is associated with
Hellenism, with the admiration of the Europeans[: for
Greece]! Now there is nothing left to admire. Only rage.
As I have shown so far, dissatisfaction with the protest has
been expressed by many Greek citizens in the backstage of
social life, behind closed doors, within homes, and in the
context of private conversations. In Patras, at least half of my
respondents expressed critical remarks about one or another
dimension of protest itself. Although all citizens where con-
cerned about—and mostly agitated with—the austerity mea-
sures, there were several men and women over the age of
thirty-five and affiliated with either of the two majority po-
litical parties, who admitted that a certain level of austerity
was unavoidable, almost necessary. Many conversations in
which I participated ended with contained, implicit, and crit-
ical remarks about financial mismanagement in the civil sec-
tor, laziness by some fellow citizens, and concern about who
appropriates the title of the “indignant” or “infuriated.” Here
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is one more opinion of representing this not-very-public po-
sition of discontent:
We are not talking about the indignants of the (Constitu-
tion) square. Don’t be bothered with them! They took
(credit) cards and loans, and are infuriated because they lost
their “extras.” They are the infuriated of the civil sector.
The real indignants are not in the square.
The Perspective of the Protesters
We don’t owe, we won’t pay (den hrostame, den pliron-
oume). (protesters’ call, Constitution Square, Greece, July
2011)
We are not indignant, we are infuriated (den eimaste agan-
aktismenoi, eimaste orgismenoi). (protesters’ call, Con-
stitution Square, Greece, July 2011)
In May, June, and July 2011 the protesters in Constitution
Square voiced their defiance toward the austerity measures
imposed by the Greek government and requested by the Eu-
ropean Union. For many this was also an expression of dis-
content with the economic system that led Greece and other
European countries into debt. The protesters with whom I
talked highlighted that they were paying the consequences of
the mismanagement of others: Greek and foreign politicians,
bankers, speculators, multinational banks, and corrupted civil
servants. Their infuriation was grounded in a profound sense
of injustice that they felt: they—the people of Greece, and
the young people of Greece, in particular—are not responsible
for the country’s enormous debt. The motto “we don’t owe,
we won’t pay” becomes meaningful in the context of this
perceived sense of injustice.
On the whole, the issues of justice and accountability were
central to the rhetoric and emotional outburst of the pro-
testers; they were also expressed in the concerns voiced by
the critics of the protesters, some of which I presented in the
previous section. However, the most striking difference be-
tween the discourse of the protesters and that of their critics
was the stance of open and categorical defiance adopted by
the former. They did so with spontaneity, irony, and dyna-
mism, refusing to calculate the consequences of noncompli-
ance to EU regulations and the austerity measures. From their
point of view, the economic rationality of the government
and the EU leadership was part of the problem: it perpetuates
social injustice. So they refused to think in term of conse-
quences such as, for example, what will happen to their coun-
try or to themselves if Greece does not comply to the logic
of austerity. The rationality of consequences was perceived by
many of the protesters as a rhetoric of threats and was dis-
missed as government or EU propaganda.
The protesters’ defiant stance—as in many other cases of
resistance (Ortner 1995)—earned the immediate sympathy of
this ethnographer and many other citizens in the capital and
the rest of the country. Approximately half of my respondents
in Patras commented favorably about the protesters in the
square, sharing a strong identification with them. A couple
of university students from Patras who study in Athens—and
spent lots of time in the square—shared with me details of
their participation, the sense of communitas—in Turner’s
(1969) terms—that they experienced during the protest. For
them, participating in this public demonstration of discontent
was more important than the so-called (dithen) rational ar-
guments of those who were more critically predisposed toward
the protest. As one of the two students stressed repeatedly
(about six times in the same conversation): “I would like us
to go bankrupt! To see how it will be . . . to see what will
happen then! Yes! Let’s go bankrupt!”12
This provocative statement highlights the disbelief of the
protesters in the announcements of the government that the
austerity measures were necessary and unavoidable. It also
relies on the belief of many in Greece that the economically
powerful of Europe, despite their strict recommendations and
formalist (almost punitive discourse), will not let Greece go
bankrupt, because they will suffer, in turn, from the chain
reaction of a likely Euro catastrophe. As I mentioned in the
previous section, some in Patras argue that this argument
represents an attitude of bravado and blackmailing. Many
among their fellow citizens, however, derive from this logic
of European interdependency a sense of empowerment: they
see in resistance the possibility of negotiating better terms.
In previous work, focusing on the anti-American discourse
in Greece and Panama, I have argued that local actors in the
periphery of power derive a sense of empowerment from the
practice of discussing in critical terms the policies of the “pow-
erful” (Kirtsoglou and Theodossopoulos 2010b; Theodosso-
poulos 2010). In the context of the Greek anti-austerity pro-
test, this tactic permeated almost every other conversation.
“They are afraid of us!” a protester repeated several times in
Constitution Square (referring to the leaders of the European
Union), “if we fall, they will perish as well!” Ideas like these
inspired many similar arguments of empowerment and fueled
the protesters with confidence in defying the “rational” and
“technocratic” logic of the austerity measures. It was on these
grounds that a 40-year-old civil engineer back in Patras re-
jected the borrowing of additional foreign money: “They hold
us in the intensive care unit, like we are in a coma. If we go
bankrupt, this will be a situation. We will come out of the
coma, we will become alive again!”
I overcame my initial bewilderment with the self-destruc-
tive dimension inherent in this type of argument after several
conversations with friends and respondents in Patras, during
which the idea that bankruptcy will signal a “resurrection” of
the nation reappeared several times: “It is as though they push
a drowning person deeper underwater, letting him take a
breath every other minute. This is not a life worth living. If
we reach the bottom (of the sea), only then will we be able
12. Ego goustaro na ginei hreokopia . . . goustaro na do pos einai! Na
do ti tha ginei! Nai! As hreokopisoume!
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to burst free and break the bonds.”13 Such radical views, which
sound explicitly Marxist, were expressed in discussions about
the anti-austerity measures by citizens from diverse political
orientations, even supporters of the then ruling (moderately
socialist) party. They had been partly inspired by journalistic
reviews of the crisis in Argentina and other Latin American
countries, which highlighted economic recovery after periods
of crisis. The view that economic bankruptcy is not the end
of the world was developed through conversations or public
protest to a stance of audacity, signaling resistance to the
government and the expectations of the powerful of the Eu-
ropean Union.
The issue of foreign guardianship (kidemonia) similarly fu-
elled strong reactions, especially among left-leaning indig-
nants, who possessed a very articulate vocabulary to highlight
inequalities in the capitalist system. In a similar line, citizens
from all political affiliations condemned the “powerful of the
world” for Greece’s predicament, with refined irony and rhe-
torical confidence, drawing upon a well-established rhetorical
practice in the Greek context (Herzfeld 1982, 1992; Kirtsoglou
and Theodossopoulos 2010b; Loizos 1981). Other familiar
rhetorical practices, such as “analogic thinking” (Sutton
1998)—the use of lessons from the past to explain the pre-
sent—were prominent in the many discussions in which I
participated in Patras. Here arguments—expressed as lessons
from history—focused on the self-interested policies of West-
ern nations, their alleged ungratefulness toward Greece (which
has offered so much to Western civilization), and the harsh
economic rationality of German politicians:14
The foreigners are worried that we will not return the bor-
rowed money. They don’t really care about Greece. They
never did. History has proven that, again and again: the
nations of the West use Greece for their own interests.
Ha! The Germans! They say we owe them money! They
forget how much they owe to us: the destruction they caused
in the war, the war-compensations that we did not claim
after the war. History is re-written again. The people of the
West were always ungrateful for all that Greece has offered
them.
The selective recirculation of conclusions reached in the past,
and in the context of other crises, is often used in local po-
litical discourse in Greece to strengthen the validity of new
arguments (cf. Theodossopoulos 2004, 2007b). Here the latest
position of defiance—representing the “we don’t owe, we
won’t pay” argument—was consolidated by analogic thinking
and older preexisting anti-Western narratives. On the whole,
the discourse of discontent that has emerged in the past year
13. For the importance of the notion of the resurrection of the nation
in Greece, see, among others, Millas 2007.
14. In many conversations, Angela Merkel (Chancellor of Germany)
became the target of satirical anecdotes in a manner that resembled the
local Greek commentary on Madeleine Albright (US Secretary of State)
during the NATO intervention in Yugoslavia (cf. Brown and Theodos-
sopoulos 2000, 2003).
in Greece is developing—as I am writing these lines—in fa-
miliar, and at the same time unexplored, directions, incor-
porating—every day—new arguments, metaphors, conspiracy
theories, and rhetorical twists. In Patras, where I am familiar
with the personal histories of my respondents, I documented
the expression of indignation as a complex discourse that
crosscuts political affiliations and socioeconomic boundaries.
In Constitution Square in Athens, the lack of coherence in
political orientation among the protesters, and also the com-
plexity of their social profiles, led some commentators to talk
about “tribes of the indignant” (see Georgiadou 2011:101).
Political activists of different persuasions, homeless individ-
uals, immigrants, a priest [who set up his own indignant-
orthodoxy kiosk], pensioners, dog walkers, and tourists
shared hours or fleeting moments in the square. Those pro-
testers who camped on the site, a heterogeneous tribe in dis-
content, participated in the most dramatic moments of the
protest but also relaxed in their tents, used their laptops to
connect with other protesters in Spain and Portugal, bought
food from the nearby kiosks, talked to the elderly pensioners
who frequent the square’s benches, entertained themselves
with music late at night, and devoted lots of energy and
enthusiasm to explaining their positions to passersby.
“From May to July, we felt that the square, was another
place to visit. Not only to protest, but (also) to socialize . . .
to stop by and talk with the protesters, share our concerns,”
said a young woman from Patras who now lives in Athens.
Individuals who did not wish to protest, or were critical about
the protest, visited the square out of curiosity, or to pursue
a semiaccidental meeting “with that handsome boy or pretty
girl they expected to be there.” And later, in the course of
July, many protesters departed from the campsite: “It is time
for them to go on summer holiday, to Anafi, Folegandros or
another island with free camping,” said one of the critically
predisposed citizens with uncontained sarcasm. Yet, when the
police officially closed the site on the last weekend of July
2011, the remaining protesters raised their voice for one final
time: “You do not scare us, you infuriate us: we continue
peacefully, with determination and creative spirit.”15
Conclusions
The local views that I presented in the previous sections shed
some light on the complexity of the anti-austerity protest in
Greece, its dynamic nature, and its capability to move beyond
and between traditional political alignments. During conver-
sations about the protest, local actors used selectively left- or
right-wing political arguments to arrive at diverse conclusions
about the protest, in a desire to explain the financial crisis,
make meaningful its causes and, during this process, to ar-
ticulate their own personal trajectory of discontent. This at-
tempt intentionally engendered a desire to make apparent the
15. Den mas fovizete, mas exorgizete, synehizoume eirinika, apofasistika,
dimiourgika.
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unique perspective or circumstances of one’s one personal
indignation, an intention achieved (in many cases) through
commentary about others. In the resulting discourse, many
local actors did not merely attempt to explain the causes of
the crisis but also the incentives motivating the indignation
of their fellow citizens and the policies of other nations: the
Other—proximate and personalized or foreign and undiffer-
entiated—provided the point of departure for rhetorical self-
reflection (cf. Theodossopoulos 2007a).
And so local commentary often focused on the causes of
indignation, the accountability of discontent. In most cases
responsibility was traced externally: among wasteful politi-
cians, inefficient civil servants, unscrupulous speculators, and
inequalities in the global financial system. This proclivity to
explain away problems by stressing external causal factors has
been analyzed by psychologists in terms of attribution biases,
such as the self-serving bias: the tendency of attributing failure
to external situations and success on inherent qualities.16 In
local commentary about politics in Greece, mistakes are fre-
quently blamed on inherent qualities in the character of others:
self-interested protesters, lazy civil servants, ungrateful Ger-
mans, exploited Greeks. To anthropologists this style of thinking
“looks suspiciously like the racial characterology of the nine-
teenth and very early twentieth centuries, and . . . reproduces
the humoralists’ practices of dividing up the world into un-
changing types of people” (Herzfeld 1992:134). It certainly re-
minds us of the culture and personality school in anthropology,
or Huntington’s civilizational orders (1996), types of expla-
nation that resort in caricaturing peripheral actors (or cultural
Others) according to stable essentialist dispositions.
To avoid such stereotyping—which is often disguised as
“theorizing” in psychology and political theory—I follow here
an anthropological and interpretative approach in explaining
blame. I call attention to the profound disbelief of most local
Greek actors in the transparency of their political system: their
aversion for the formalism and inefficiency of Greek bureau-
cracy (Herzfeld 1992) or their distaste—complicit as this may
be—for clientalist structures that have not radically changed
in past decades (cf. Mouzelis 1978) and political practices that
can still be explained by using classic anthropological work
from the 1960s, such as John Campbell’s (1964) deeply per-
ceptive analysis of patronage. For Herzfeld (1992) the dis-
appointment of local actors with a disempowering bureau-
cratic system is negotiated through a secular theodicy of
accountability. As with many other flaws in the world that
often lie beyond one’s control, secular misfortunes (such as
a financial crisis) beg explanation: the interpretative attempts
of my respondents to justify their protest (or comment on
the protest of others) represents such a cultural meaningful
16. The concept of self-serving bias was based on Heider’s (1958) work
on behavioral attributions. The particular bias has been subsequently
criticized for lacking empirical underpinnings (see Miller and Ross 1975).
Nowadays, the ambiguity and generality of self-serving judgments is rec-
ognized (Roese and Olson 2007).
response that resonates with a well-established discourse of
attributing blame on systemic factors.
Such interpretive attempts during the anti-austerity protest
resulted in multiple interpretations of the crisis, which, al-
though diverse, seem persuasive when they are voiced in local
conversation: this is because the recently imposed austerity
measures in Greece echo other familiar explanations of bu-
reaucratic imposition or injustice that already have an estab-
lished place in the local secular theodicy. “Such explanations
are not necessarily believed by those to whom they are of-
fered,” Herzfeld explains, “but it is not at all clear that belief
is the issue” (1992:7). Here, blaming Others to escape re-
sponsibility is not merely a rhetorical tactic but is also, more
importantly, an attempt to explain—and through explaining
decode and make less threatening—an external crisis, which
is beyond one’s control. It is in this respect that the negoti-
ation of blame in Greece seems less mechanical and more
complex than the perpetuation of a self-serving bias.
Seen from this point of view, the process of commenting
on the crisis and the austerity measures can be seen as em-
powering. In previous work I have argued that the discursive
practice of cutting down to size (and discussing as equals)
the powerful—often in an overtly critical manner—contrib-
utes to developing a perspective of local empowerment (Kirt-
soglou and Theodossopoulos 2010b; Theodossopoulos 2010).
This rhetorical tactic becomes more evident in times of crisis
(see Brown and Theodossopoulos 2000, 2003; Loizos 1981;
Sutton 1998), but it is also common in everyday social life,
especially in the context of dealing with bureaucracy (Herzfeld
1982, 1992). In the context of the Greek financial crisis, many
ordinary citizens, unable to change the course of events that
affected their lives, looked—as some similarly infuriated Ar-
gentinean citizens did 10 years ago (Goddard 2010)—beyond
the mechanical rationality of the economic establishment. By
contesting the prescriptions of the European financial estab-
lishment, the protesters did not explain the problem away (or
simply refuted responsibility); they voiced their view that al-
ternative economic and social policies (or solutions) may exist.
Their defiant stance was criticized in less public local com-
mentary by other Greek citizens who adopted positions that
did not refute neoliberal economic rationality and also by
left-leaning individuals who criticize capitalism on a more
prescriptive agenda. As with the protesters, the discourse of
those who were critically predisposed toward the protest ech-
oes a very similar desire to assume some sense of control over
the interpretation of the crisis. The critics of the protesters
were also indignant, and their criticism of particular mani-
festations of infuriation-cum-protest provided them with a
sense of interpretative control over their own perceived peri-
pheralization. Thus, in most cases, I would argue, divergent
degrees and forms of (or identifications with) indignation
represent a profound desire to (rhetorically) subdue the crisis
through interpretation and identify its causes.
The dynamic nature of the resulting (multiple) local ex-
planations of the protest rely, as with other political discourses
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in Greece (cf. Theodossopoulos 2004), on a combination of
new and older arguments. Here uncertainty in the present is
negotiated in terms of certainty about the past (Just 1995)
and analogic thinking—the interpretation of the present in
terms of familiar historical themes (Sutton 1998). In more
private contexts, local interpretative tactics also include (in
combination with analogic thinking) the sharing of dreams
articulating anxiety about (or attempting to diagnose) the
crisis (cf. Stewart 2012) and the occasional references to
prophecies or conspiracy-prone narratives (cf. Brown and
Theodossopoulos 2000, 2003), which “fill the explanatory
void, the epistemic black hole, that is increasingly said to have
been left behind by the unsettling of moral communities”
(Comaroff and Comaroff 2003:287).
Such a sense of unsettlement permeates local discourse
about the financial crisis in Greece and fuels the declaration
of outrage. The historically embedded relationship between
debt and obligation, combined with a perceived lack of social
controls or institutions that moderate or cancel debt (Graeber
2011), leads many Greeks to believe, as Herzfeld has recently
explained, that obligation is negotiated unidirectionally: the
politicians and technocrats that negotiate the restructuring of
the Greek debt promote “a one-way indebtedness antithetical
to Greek notions of obligation” (Herzfeld 2011:24). Such cul-
tural mismatches, argues Hirschon (2012), represent onto-
logical differences in the perception of time, personhood, and
authority, and become apparent in the dissonance of expec-
tations between foreign technocrats and local—culturally sit-
uated—actors.
In the local context—where social obligations matter—
character evaluations provide more persuasive arguments
than abstract economic ideas. In the preceding sections I have
presented character evaluations based on one’s hard (or not
hard) working ethos, resonating with an agonistic view of life
as a “struggle” elucidated by previous ethnographic analyses
(du Boulay 1974; Friedl 1962; Herzfeld 1992; Theodossopou-
los 2003b). Here, arguments that rely on the semantics of a
hard-working ethos draw their persuasiveness by appealing
to a moral community—a sphere of sociality—threatened by
the impersonal and monetary dimension of the crisis (see
Parry and Bloch 1989). Such a demand for resocializing the
terms of economic interaction reemerges in different histor-
ical periods (Graeber 2011) and should be viewed separately
from the pervasive and colonizing consciousness of neoliberal
capitalism. In fact, as becomes apparent in the example of
Greek “agonistic” ethos (and the related notions of life as
struggle and hard work), similar cultural values support the
stance of both the protesters and their critiques, both sides
being equally concerned about the collapse of the moral com-
munity: unemployed “indignants” from both leftist and con-
servative persuasions demand the dignity of work.
“Embarrassing” examples of protest behavior, such as the
destruction of marble around Constitution Square or the en-
campment of the protesters, are criticized as inappropriate
for the public profile of Greece, echoing the disemic orien-
tation of Greek local discourse between the formality of public
representation and the informality of culturally intimate con-
texts (Herzfeld 1997). In all these respects, anthropological
concepts can help us appreciate the complexity of local dis-
content in ways that move beyond statistics, mathematical
models, and hard data (Papagaroufali 2011). After all, what can
be a more striking example of disemia—an anthropological
concept developed by Herzfeld 3 decades before the current
crisis—than the desire of the overwhelming majority of Greeks
to remain in the Euro-zone but not abide by the economic
rationality that (purportedly) will guarantee Greece’s position
in the Euro-zone!
As we have seen so far, the threat and experience of austerity
in Greece is negotiated in terms of contradictory and com-
plicated “indignant” views, the ambivalent “poetics” of dis-
content. New types of protest have emerged that defy old
political boundaries and affiliations (Yiakoumaki 2011), fa-
cilitated by a new digital mediascape that communicates dis-
content from the bottom-up (Papailias 2011). Yet, older ar-
guments tinted by established political affiliations persist and,
as I have argued in previous work (Theodossopoulos 2003a,
2007b), reappear in the form of new combinations of argu-
ments, providing connections between established interpre-
tative threads and the latest news about the crisis. Thus, my
interpretation of the local indignation in this article does not
attempt to offer an all-inclusive explanation of a developing
crisis. It rather represents a modest attempt to draw attention
to the complexity and dynamic nature of local resistance,
which can be—to paraphrase Ortner (1995:191)—“more than
opposition,” a “truly creative and transformative” process.
From this perspective, we can see the discourse of local dis-
content in Greece as an attempt to contextualize—and make
less threatening at the discursive level—the crisis and the
impeding austerity. The arguments of the infuriated Greeks—
as these were articulated in 2011—did not provide absolute
explanations of events but interpretative connections, mean-
ingful within a preexisting secular theodicy of accountability.
From this culturally informed point of view, the two local
arguments below can be seen as similarly defiant and ago-
nistic, representing a resisting stance toward the unsettling of
the moral community:
I am happy to see [my fellow-]Greeks suffering. It is about
time! They sit all day in the cafeteria and have an opinion
about everything. They swallow up the government’s and
the European Union’s money. Now, with the crisis they will
learn what work is. They will learn to work like we do. (55-
year-old Greek migrant in Panama City, Panama, April
2011)
I want us to go bankrupt. Yes, I want to see what will happen
if Greece goes bankrupt. I am bored with hearing all the
threats [about the potential bankruptcy] from the govern-
ment and the powerful of Europe. Let’s go bankrupt then,
to see what will happen. (24-year-old Greek student in Pa-
tras, Greece, June 2011)
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Dimitrios Theodossopoulos sets out to analyze what he calls
“critical local discourse” about and among the “infuriated,”
the participants of the protest movement against the Greek
government’s austerity measures in 2011. He proposes a bot-
tom-up analysis, building from his ethnographic observations
through conversations with people met in Patras and Athens
during the summer of 2011 and also among Greek migrants
to Panama, where he is also conducting fieldwork. According
to the author, this perspective allows more focus on local
views rather than on resistance, thus avoiding romanticizing
resistance. This statement may refer to Cultural Anthropology’s
October 2011 forum in relation to the Greek crisis (http://
www.culanth.org/?qpnode/432), and more specifically to
Rosen (2011) and Papailias (2011). To give more context, it
is good to mention Theodossopoulos’s plenary paper at the
EASA conference in July 2012 in Paris on the Greek crisis
and the study of resistance (2012).
In this paper, Theodossopoulos analyzes representations of
the crisis against older anthropological work on representa-
tions of self and other in relation to national identity, on the
attribution of stereotypes, on the ambivalent position in re-
spect to the West, on the poetics of honor and shame, on the
strategy of blaming others while avoiding responsibility, on
the intricate relations of citizens and bureaucratic states, with
special emphasis on Michael Herzfeld’s work on Greece
(Herzfeld 1985, 1987, 1992 and 1997). It is about examining
core concepts of the anthropology of Greece in relation to
timely ethnographic data in the context of economic crisis
and the way it is experienced and represented in Greece.
The demonstrations and occupation of Syntagma Square
in Athens that took place from May to July 2011, widely
reported in international news, shared a few common features
with those that took place in Spain (indignados) and the
United States (Occupy Wall Street): nonaffiliation to political
parties and a discourse hostile and defiant toward government
officers and members of Parliament—situated on the other
side of Syntagma Square. Theodossopoulos argues that other
Greeks criticizing the protesters did so on the basis of com-
mon values: Greek migrants in Panama who represent them-
selves as working hard but also older people in Greece who
had experienced hardship and poverty in WW II, accused the
protesters of lacking moral character and being spoiled, lazy,
and irresponsible. The “infuriated with the infuriated” are not
adopting a different ethic (Western capitalist ethic, for in-
stance); they ground their opposition on what Mediterranean
anthropologists have termed a “hard-work ethic” or “ago-
nistic” spirit, life as a struggle: hard work, resistance, defi-
ance—all come together into a complex nexus of values and
representations of individual or collective self.
The ethnographic material comes from three “sources”:
actors among the protesters in Syntagma Square, onlookers
and/or other commentators in Athens and the city of Patras,
and Greek migrants in Panama commenting on events in their
home country. This bottom-up stance offers the reader scant
information and limited context related to the phenomenon
of the protest. Theodossopoulos makes the choice not to in-
clude in his study top-down interpretations made by econ-
omists, journalists, or political analysts. Limiting one’s scope
to the local and the oral is limiting access to sociological
context and local knowledge. The choice then is not just
between a “bottom-up” and a “top-down” analysis; it is also
between oral and written data, between firsthand and “pro-
cessed” information. Context includes newspapers, TV shows,
but also facts and figures that can be found in other specialists’
work on the Greek crisis, including fellow anthropologists
working in Greece and commenting on the crisis. Very few
references to this production are made—and only in passing,
at the end of the paper. Leaving out such rich data (articles,
blogs, interviews, books) is a methodological choice that needs
to be addressed and discussed in more detail, especially in
relation to the argument about resistance. The “left” (Aristera)
media is a case in point: here is where the different attitudes
around the notion of “resistance” are debated and com-
mented. Comparing writings about self and other, Greece and
Europe, or national and social stereotypes on the value of
work, on the agonistic rhetoric, or about traitors or thieves
between the “left” and the “right wing” (Dexia) media could
be rewarding.
John Gledhill
Social Anthropology, School of Social Sciences, University of Man-
chester, Arthur Lewis Building, Oxford Road, Manchester M13
9PL, United Kingdom (john.gledhill@manchester.ac.uk). 19 IX 12
That this article still seems timely is testimony to the pro-
fundity of the crisis that overshadows the future of Europe.
One thing it does well is explore what it means to think of
oneself as a citizen of a “peripheral” zone of that precarious
political construction, burdened, in the case of Greeks, with
a particularly uncomfortable historical relationship with Ger-
many, the state with the most power to insist on the cate-
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gorical imperative of austerity in the face of denunciations of
its irrationality by economists of the stature of Joseph Stiglitz
and Paul Krugman. That alone suggests that the European
crisis is not simply financial and economic, but Theodosso-
poulos’s purpose is not to analyze crisis from above but in
terms of the discourses that Greeks produce when talking to
each other about crisis and austerity within their own intimate
cultural worlds.
The paper shows that some Greeks are “indignant” about
the crisis but nevertheless declare themselves “indignant”
about other Greeks who have taken up the challenge of the
Spanish “indignados” to occupy public space (to reject not
simply cuts and austerity but also conventional party-based
liberal democratic politics, although that aspect is not ex-
plored much here). Theodossopoulos seeks to give actor
voices priority over a priori analyst theorizing about the
meaning of protests on the lines recommended by Sherry
Ortner in her celebrated critique of the “interpretive refusal”
of much of the resistance studies boom of the 1980s. This is
an aim with which I wholly sympathize, and, not being a
Greek specialist, I learned a lot simply from the way the article
showed the broader historical and cultural resonance of par-
ticular elements of the discourses it reported. Methodologi-
cally, the piece was opportunistic in a positive way, since it
was the author’s work on indigenous people in Panama that
brought him into conversation with Greek migrants working
in that country, with their strong discourse on laziness and
corruption in the home country as the root of its problems.
It would be interesting to follow this up in other areas of the
Greek migrant diaspora, including Germany, where Greek
workers escaping from the crisis apparently find themselves
stigmatized in terms of the same stereotypes. But Theodos-
sopoulos takes us beyond what can be explained in terms of
the “orientalization” of southern Europe toward thinking
about the development of a double consciousness on the part
of socially situated groups of Greek actors that also reflects a
local “work ethic” forged in the aftermath of war. Such an-
tiessentialist accounts of the historical production of “culture”
are particularly valuable contributions to contemporary po-
litical debate. Methodologically and epistemologically, eth-
nography based on enjoying the culturally intimate company
of other Greeks challenges the contention that cultural “oth-
erness” is invariably an asset, particularly when time is short
and the researcher aspires to access a broad spectrum of re-
search subjects. Although the interpretative framework
adopted clearly rests on the contributions of both Greek and
non-Greek anthropologists, there was no lack of critical dis-
tance in this exercise in “native anthropology.”
Theodossopoulos relates his diverse range of voices to var-
iables such as age and political orientation. People on the left
of the political spectrum criticize the protestors in Consti-
tution Square for lack of a coherent strategic and organiza-
tional vision, for example, and the damage the protestors do
to marble offends more conservative citizens. We are told
about differences over how best to negotiate over the austerity
packages, the long-standing contradictions of Greek desires
to remain in the Euro-zone but not accept the rules of the
game that it imposes, and the different ways Greeks try to
“subdue the crisis” through interpretation and assignment of
blame. But we are not told much about class, a pity since
some would argue that the core of recent protest movements
consists of young people whose perceived life chances have
deteriorated sharply. Nor are we told much about the impli-
cations of the different forms of “indignation” for Greek pol-
itics. The ultra right seems absent from this discussion. To
argue that both “leftist” and “conservative” arguments are
“similarly defiant and agonistic” responses to the “unsettling
of the moral community” perhaps replicates past tendencies
to look on the bright side in resistance studies. As in the case
of the Occupy movement, differences in social situations, his-
torical experience, and ideas about dignified conduct reduce
the likelihood of convergence between social actors even
where most are afflicted by the crisis. Given the social impacts
of austerity, which apparently include a sharp increase in su-
icide rates, we should try to move on from feelings of em-
powerment linked to discourse, or to participation in protest
action, to ponder the material balance of social and political
relations, the fields of force of hegemony and transformation.
Although historians may ultimately find that easier to do
successfully than anthropologists, this paper offers us essential
foundations for beginning the task.
Roger Just
(fprogerjust@gmail.com). 8 X 12
If there is one thing everyone is agreed on, it is that Greece
is in an economic mess and increasingly a social and political
one. After that, matters become a little more contentious. Has
the crisis been caused by endemic corruption among Greece’s
political classes and a chronic unwillingness by its citizens to
pay their taxes; by an unsustainable system of pensions and
social benefits and a Greek disinclination to do a decent day’s
work; by structural incompatibilities between the Greek econ-
omy and the economies of northern Europe and a historically
overweening ambition by French and German politicians to
enlarge the European Union regardless of the economic frailty
of the newer states it encompassed; or by the inherently un-
stable nature of late capitalism and the knock-on effects of
collapses in international banking and financial markets? And
what is to be done? Should yet further austerity measures be
imposed on a population already suffering real material hard-
ship and with no foreseeable end to its misery; should the
EU strive toward greater fiscal integration, and therefore gov-
ernance, of its members states at the price of national sov-
ereignty and the erosion of democratic institutions; should
Greece have its debts forgiven or at least renegotiated, leaving
northern Europe (with its own problems) to pour yet more
money into what has every appearance of a black hole; should
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Greece be expelled from the EU or at least the Euro-zone,
for which, apparently, no plan B exists; or should Greece
unilaterally decide to declare itself bankrupt and see what
happens then to the rest of Europe? And finally, there is the
apportioning of blame in all this: corrupt politicians, lazy
Greeks, unrealistic ambitions, ill-conceived plans, heartless
technocrats, greedy bankers, the mysterious machinations of
“the market,” and the interests of other international parties
both within and without the EU.
As Theodossopoulos suggests, these are the sorts of issues
that have been (and are being) “overanalyzed by economists,
journalists, and political commentators.” His approach is to
avoid such top-down analyses and instead, as befits an eth-
nographer, to focus on local interpretations of discontent and
local conversations about the national and international
events in which the Greeks are currently embroiled. To my
mind, the question must then be: what does such an eth-
nographic approach add? I think it has to be admitted that
what it does not add is some radically new understanding of
the “Greek crisis” overlooked by economists, journalists, and
political commentators. Nor is that surprising. If one leaves
aside the personal dimensions of individual suffering so be-
loved by TV journalism (and which, wisely, Theodossopoulos
does leave aside), then local interpretations and local con-
versations of national and international events are inevitably
refractions and partial recapitulations of the top-down anal-
yses with which we are familiar. Theodossopoulos’s infor-
mants may be in the thick of it, but when it comes to un-
derstanding what is going on, then they too are reliant on
the top-down analyses of economists, journalists, and political
commentators (of which they are assiduous readers).
What Theodossopoulos’s ethnographic approach does add
is nevertheless extremely important, for “on the ground” the
Greeks’ response to the crisis is anything but uniform. The
versions of events they espouse, in part or in whole, are quite
various and do not even divide along the predictable lines of
political allegiance. This is true even when it comes to issues
of blame. In moments of what Herzfeldt has famously termed
“cultural intimacy,” they are deeply self-critical, and there are
those who style themselves as “indignant with the indignant.”
This alone should put paid to the notion pedaled in some
sections of the northern European media that Greece is a
nation of people happy to play the bouzouki while the Treaty
of Rome burns. On the contrary, what an ethnographic ac-
count shows is a nation of people desperately, and variously,
trying to understand the causes and consequences of the sit-
uation in which they find themselves and over which they
have very little control. And it is in this attempt to understand
their own predicament that the various and contradictory
narratives they espouse, while not radically different from
those proffered by external commentators, can be seen in a
new light. The Greeks may be powerless (as most of us are
powerless) to substantially affect the course of national and
international events, but at least the ability to comment on
them (and thereby to comment on one’s collective self), to
become the observer as well as the observed, affords a degree
of empowerment. To coin a phrase: if you can’t beat them,
analyze them. Theodossopoulos suggests that this is a tactic
historically ingrained in Greek society. I would agree. I doubt,
however, that it is an exclusively Greek proclivity (which is
why it is important for the study of resistance). After all, it
may be, subliminally at least, why so many of us became
academics.
Konstantinos Kalantzis
(kkalantzis@googlemail.com). 8 X 12
Theodossopoulos’s essay makes a significant contribution to
the ethnographic understanding of experiences of the Greek
crisis (cf. Dalakoglou 2012; Herzfeld 2011; Kalantzis 2012;
Yiakoumaki 2011). The author commendably brings to the
fore Greek epistemologies that entail, so he argues, nuanced
and often contradictory perspectives on the question of the
crisis: something neglected in the macro-analytical models
that dominate public discussions/representations of the mat-
ter (cf. Kalantzis 2012:7). However, the distinction that Theo-
dossopoulos draws between local views and public represen-
tations of the crisis is possibly too acute, as it sidesteps the
potential of exploring how local views become shaped in light
of what occurs in the field of public representation. An anal-
ysis toward that end would have been particularly pertinent,
given that many of his informants’ views are echoed in various
official spheres of enunciation.
A similarly sharp distinction is drawn between the “local”
and wider political forces in his discussion of Greek notions
of obligation and the Greek work ethic. Drawing on Herzfeld
and Hirschon, the author considers the “local” to be operating
in a “relatively autonomous” fashion (as certain subaltern
studies scholars might label it; cf. O’Hanlon 1988:206) in
relation to what he sees as external to it (e.g., the European
work ethic). Rather than choosing between the local as on-
tologically distinct and/or the local as a product of (a total-
izing) European influence, however, one could instead trace
the various amalgamations and power flows that occur be-
tween the local level and the various European ideologies/
orientalism(s) that affect it.
Theodossopoulos successfully demonstrates the multiplic-
ity of Greek views on the crisis, especially as he examines the
Syntagma Square 2011 protests, a sphere that could be anach-
ronistically (and provocatively) described in Marx’s own
words as a “mixture of high-frown phrases and actual un-
certainly . . . of enthusiastic striving for innovation and more
deeply-rooted domination of the old routine” (Marx 2008
[1852]:22).
His discussion of the square captures the fluidity and po-
tential of that new political arena and briefly acknowledges
the parameter of materiality (even if translated into what
people say), which could, however, have been more central
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to the essay. On one level, his elision of materiality might
have dissatisfied the square’s left-leaning participants, who
would presumably insist more on the importance of the ma-
terial sphere (both in the Marxist sense, e.g., the lost jobs,
and in the sense of sensorial experience, e.g., the police tear-
gas) as opposed to the essay’s emphasis on “views” and “rhet-
oric.” Further, though I applaud the effort of tracing the
common “aesthetics of exasperation” (Kalantzis 2012:7) that
characterize the whole square, one might have expected more
reference to the (experiential and symbolic) distinctions
within the geography of Syntagma (cf. Panourgia 2011). For
instance, the division between the lower and the upper square,
though perhaps simplifying, has become a leitmotif in leftist
commentary, especially after the recent election of an ultra-
right-wing party that is seen as linked to the patriotic carni-
valesque performed at the so-called upper square.
This point on social topography leads me to comment
further on the interconnected question of the body (Stally-
brass and White 1986:192) and its relative absence from this
essay. Theodossopoulos’s ethnography briefly includes the
question of tactile materiality (e.g., the sunburned arm as a
sign of hard work), but the author otherwise tends to relegate
everything to the sphere of “discursive weapons” and “rhe-
torical tactics.” This subjects the vibrant complexity of am-
bivalent dissent that he documents to specific (linguistic-
based) models (e.g., disemia), which neatly place things into
stable (op)positions. Recent anthropological work has em-
phasized the importance of the visual and material as spheres
that may complicate what we know from the sphere of dis-
course and rhetoric (Pinney 2006:131, 137). This is not some
altered reinscription of the old modernist distinction between
rhetoric (considered superficial) and practice (supposedly
more real) but an invitation to engage embodied culture and
go beyond the logocentric bias of ethnography.
Arguably, what the Greeks experience as tutelage then is
not a disembodied discourse that merely prompts rhetorical
negotiation of blame but a perennially vexing, felt gaze, ex-
perienced in the most culturally productive scenes (that Herz-
feld might call “culturally intimate” [1997]). Thus, a group
of Athenian tourists, inside a boat returning from their August
vacation, asked publicly in my presence, oscillating between
amusement and worry, what will the “Germans” and the
“IMF” say about their suntanned skin (the sunburned arm
being a signifier of guilty leisure this time). This reminded
me of my informants in Sphakia, Crete, who often anxiously
wondered what “will people say” during those practices that
produced both pride and uncertainty to them. Importantly,
though they often expressed verbal disapproval of these prac-
tices, they also experienced lenience or lure for them at the
level of embodied practice—something that would be oblit-
erated if one focused exclusively on rhetoric. Such consider-
ations of embodied culture push toward a model of ambiva-
lence that is more analytically recalcitrant. Yet, its political
potential draws exactly on the dynamic unpredictability of the
visceral oscillations experienced by the (Greek) dissenting actors
(cf. Bhabha 2004; Kalantzis, “On Ambivalent Nativism: He-
gemony, Photography and ‘Recalcitrant Alterity’ in Sphakia,
Crete,” unpublished manuscript under review by American Eth-
nologist).
Still, Theodossopoulos’s insightful and sympathetic essay
ethnographically grasps and puts into perspective the dis-
persed landscape of Greek discontent. His discussion opens
up the field for further interventions, which might destabilize
even those things we already know about Greek society and
account anew for the recent context of dissent and its cor-
poreality.
Eleni Myrivili
Department of Cultural Technology, University of the Aegean,
Greece (lenio@ct.aegean.gr). 8 X 12
It is refreshing to “hear” the multiplicity of voices emerging
during the “Infuriated” social movement in the summer of
2011. The international media have to a large extent portrayed
the economic and political crisis in Greece through the figure
of the “angry Greek,” missing the nuanced and often self-
critical narratives proliferating in the country.
Ethnography is truly valuable in providing rich, textured
accounts of collective action, while grand interpretative the-
ories in their abstraction tend to oversimplify. The ethno-
graphic method is particularly appropriate when trying to
understand social movements, precisely because, as Edelman
(2001:310) says, real social movements are often “notoriously
ephemeral and factionalized (Brecher, Costello, and Smith
2000; Tilly 1986), manifest major discrepancies . . . (Edelman
1999; Morris 1999; Rubin 1997), and . . . rarely attract more
than a minority of the constituencies they claim to represent
(Burdick 1998).”
However, trying to avoid appropriating, repressing, or cor-
rupting the voices of the protesting people (the ethnographic
other) by not overtheorizing (Theodossopoulos refers to Ort-
ner’s 1995 critic) has led, here, to the other extreme. This
article lacks “etiology” and purpose. The problem with avoid-
ing social movement theory and specific historical and so-
ciopolitical contextualization is that the engagement with the
material is not substantial enough. This unfortunately leads
to the same type of power relations one was trying to avoid
in the first place: that is, the distance created between the
knowing/powerful subject standing outside and above the
(messy, factionalized, contentious) knowable object of study.
We need to get beyond the chatter of the cafe´ and the
kitchen table and seriously engage the narratives of anger and
blame through a dynamic analysis of the larger political con-
text within which this particular mobilization and the reac-
tions to it are taking place. For example, what does it mean
to be “a committed conservative supporter” or “a left-wing
sympathizer” today in Greece? As the sociopolitical reality
started unraveling in the country, these political signifiers have
This content downloaded from 31.52.55.184 on Sat, 27 Apr 2013 10:40:47 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
214 Current Anthropology Volume 54, Number 2, April 2013
radically shifted in meaning. This was actually a characteristic
of the “Infuriated” movement: the powerful political party
(ideological/affective) identifications that traditionally acti-
vated such mobilizations were now suspect and often rejected.
The shift away from traditional politics, a characteristic of
the “New Social Movements” that came out of the 1960s, did
not manifest itself in Greek social mobilizations until the
twenty-first century, when (due to the crisis) it skipped ahead
into a whole new type of political identification and mobi-
lization characteristic of the “occupy” movements rallying
against global social injustices (Habermas 1981; Juris 2012;
Laclau and Mouffe 1985; Razsa and Kurnik 2012; Tarrow
2011; Touraine 1988 [1984], 2000).
How can we speak of the Greek “Infuriated” without en-
gaging the issues that concern the grand theorists of conten-
tious politics, without any references to social movement the-
ory, “resistance” theory, or any discussion about collective
action? The observation that Greeks blame each other, the
powers that be, and everyone else, as a form of “empowerment
against their perceived peripheralization,” can apply to any-
body: the German working class, African Americans in the
USA, Islamic fundamentalists, and so forth. Without any his-
toricity, without sociopolitical contextual moorings, all that
is solid melts into thin air. And this is not what we need now.
The hard realities of the increasingly desperate, depressed,
and violent city of Athens are pervasive. The fascists on ram-
pages, the politicians avoiding all responsibility, the unions
in their own orbit, the immigrants, the jobless, the homeless
. . . the country feels like runaway train. This context of a 5-
year economic and social crisis calls for more serious and
productive attention.
Eleni Papagaroufali
Department of Social Anthropology, Panteion University of Social
and Political Sciences, 136 Sygrou Avenue, 176 71 Athens, Greece
(epapag@panteion.gr, elpapgar@yahoo.gr). 14 IX 12
Theodossopoulos’s article is about the complex ways Greek
citizens expressed their “indignation” or “infuriation” with
the austerity measures imposed as a response to the recent
financial and political crisis in Greece. The article’s main vir-
tue is that it does not focus one-sidedly either on images
promoted by the national and international media—that is,
images of “angry Greeks” protesting in the Constitution
Square in Athens, or on the latter’s self-justifications. Instead,
its author also delves into the narratives of discontent of those
who, though themselves outraged with the crisis, are infuri-
ated with public protesters’ motivations of infuriation and
form of protest. Even more interesting is that the ethnogra-
pher’s interlocutors include citizens living in a town (Patras)
rather than the capital city of Athens only, as well as Greeks
who had migrated abroad (Panama City) during the postwar
and the post–Greek civil war era (early 1950s), under the
force of another financial and political “Greek crisis.” In this
way, Theodossopoulos, on the one hand, avoids identifying
“Greek crisis” with the “Athenian crisis” (Boubari 2011). On
the other, he succeeds in revealing the contradictory diversity
of Greeks’ views about responsibility and accountability, as
these emerge in “culturally intimate contexts,” in Greece or
abroad, where Greek actors feel safe enough to expose their
“mutual embarrassments”—albeit “in private conversations.”
One of the harshest criticisms expressed—in private—by
Greek-Panamanians is that public indignants are “lazy”—
compared to themselves, who have worked hard in self-exile.
Their view that protesters protest because all they know is
how to “eat” the European Union’s money and “complain”
meets with the infuriated citizens of the mainland who accuse
protesters of “serving their personal or trade-union interests.”
Through these accusations against “compatriots,” the two cat-
egories of Greeks seem to express dissatisfaction less with the
perceived crisis in “representative” democracy (see, e.g., Juris
2012; Razsa and Kurnik 2012) than with the “inappropriate”
ways protesters in the Constitution Square have chosen to
“represent” Greece and the rest of equally indignated Greeks
to the world. To their eyes, the protesters’ encampment in
front of the Parliament looked like a “gypsies’ one,” and their
rebellious rhetoric (“They are afraid of us! . . . if we fall, they
will perish as well!”) sounded not serious and threatening—
“They will throw us out of Europe!” Hence questions such
as “who had the right to appropriate the title of the indig-
nant?” or “who was justified to be more indignant than oth-
ers?” not only surfaced through Theodossopoulos’s ethnog-
raphy but revealed self-taxonomies such as “real” (vs. fake)
indignants, meaning implicitly “purer” Greeks (and “more
Europeans” for that matter)—the latter including the Greek
hard workers abroad and those who do not expose their in-
furiation in “bravado and blackmailing” ways that ridicule
their country’s public face.
Theodossopoulos makes clear that instead of discussing the
“top-down,” “overanalyzed” global-cum-European economic
background of the Greek crisis, or of interpreting resistance
“from above” (through the “overexhaustive historical or so-
ciological contextualizations” of local meanings of resistance),
he will prioritize the “bottom-up” local points of view of
protesting actors, so that he captures the “complexity of dis-
content.” Faced with all this diversity of “local interpreta-
tions,” he concludes that despite their divergences and due
to their “similar cultural values,” both public and less public
expressions of infuriation should be seen as narratives that
provide natives “with a sense of discursive empowerment
against their perceived peripherialization.”
As a reader of this otherwise very illuminating article, I
would counterargue that in an era of “fast capitalism” and
“glocalization,” it is imperative to interpret both bottom-up
and top-down practices of citizens—including the “overan-
alyzed” top-down interpretations made “by economists, jour-
nalists, and political commentators.” In the opposite case,
especially the one that prioritizes the native’s point of view,
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readers are usually confronted with an endless multiplicity of
the Same and the Similar and with the reproduction of the
us/them moralizing binarisms rather than with the quality of
complexity itself. The latter can be traced not simply in the
diverse and antithetical points of views of the locals but mainly
in the intersections between the “top,” that is, the global-
cum-European Union which is still “a work in progress”
(Abeles 2000) and thus, an “enigmatic” political configuration
(Holmes 2000, Shore 2000), and the “bottom,” namely, the
citizens of countries like Greece (though not only) who con-
front an “unexplainable (and not transparent),” thus more
complex, relationship with their state governments and the
larger international unions and organizations of states (EU,
United Nations, etc.). The Greek informants’ fear that Eu-
ropeans “will throw them out of Europe!”; the Greek-Pana-
manians’ support of the ethos of hard work as it is experienced
abroad; and the “bravado” stance of the public protesters
against Greek politicians and EU officials, show the extent to
which the bottom-up intersects with the top-down and vice
versa. Both are equally contested and constitute the locus of
complexity the author is looking for.
David Sutton
Department of Anthropology, Southern Illinois University, mail-
code 4502, Carbondale, Ilinois 62901, U.S.A. (dsutton@siu.edu).
17 IX 12
In the wake of the Greek financial crisis, many accounts of
the events in the international media have generated more
heat than light. Theodossopoulos’s article provides a refresh-
ing, complex interpretation of the divergent opinions coming
from Greeks in Greece and abroad concerning their under-
standing of the financial crisis. It highlights the “interpretive
trajectories of ordinary citizens” as they engage with the on-
going events of protest and how these interpretations may be
empowering to those otherwise marginalized from the global
discourses generated from the centers of economic and po-
litical power.
Theodossopoulos provides some of the important contexts,
social values, and familiar interpretive tropes for making sense
of competing Greek claims about the significance of work,
laziness, blame, and the role of ordinary citizens in relation
to the state. However, there are dangers in the work of con-
textualizing beliefs. As with Evans-Pritchard’s contextualiz-
ation of Zande witchcraft beliefs, we run the risk of rein-
scribing otherness if only the beliefs of the Zande require
cultural context, while Western European medical ideas are
taken for granted as rational. While Theodossopoulos is care-
ful to put “rational” in quotations at some points, elsewhere
the “rationality of consequences” is used as if it requires no
interpretative work. Ideally, Western economic discourse
would receive the same interpretive scrutiny and cultural con-
textualization as that of the infuriated. I am uncomfortable
with the notion that the protestors were “self-destructive” and
“refus[ed] to calculate the consequences of noncompliance to
EU regulations and the austerity measures.” Perhaps that may
be true for some. In my own research, however, I found that
just as those “infuriated with the infuriated” foresaw devas-
tating consequences of noncompliance, protestors also fore-
saw the devastating consequences of compliance with mea-
sures that many would argue are continuing to strangle the
Greek economy while opening up the likelihood of the mas-
sive sale of national assets—Greece itself—to outsiders. Thus
the importance of the protestors’ arguments throughout that
there were other solutions. Certainly one of the ways that
neoliberalism becomes hegemonic is through insinuating itself
as the only “rational” solution to contemporary world events.
In making this argument I believe I am extending Theo-
dossopoulos’s call for taking local voices seriously. In my own
research on the crisis with my student Leonidas Vournelis (see
Vournelis and Sutton 2012), we have traced some of the ways
that food has been central to the discourse about the crisis—
in arguments over “who ate the money”—and in the protests
themselves. Here we have seen a variety of acts from Com-
munist MP Liana Canelli’s attempt to enter a loaf of bread
and a liter of milk into the parliamentary record, to dairy
and potato farmers giving away their products free to pro-
testors, to protestors in Crete setting up traditional cast-iron
pots in the central square and cooking pasta to distribute to
passersby. In each of these cases food is used, because of its
centrality in Greek culture as a marker of sociability, to crit-
icize the potential of the austerity measures to abrogate the
most basic community bonds, to challenge specific govern-
ment policies and suggest alternatives,17 and to reassert claims
to a moral community of commensality that is, also, the
community of the nation.
One of the most striking uses of food in the Greek protests
has been the employment of yogurt as a projectile to hurl at
politicians of all parties, as well as at police. Not any yogurt
was chosen for this—it was typically sheep’s milk yogurt, that
is, yogurt most clearly associated with rurality and images of
traditional Greekness. The sharp contrast between eating
food—a traditionally social activity in Greece based on shar-
ing, remembering, and exchanging—and the use of food as
a tool of condemnation and ridicule reflects the equally sharp
contrast between the protestors’ vision of an economy em-
bedded in a moral community and the neoliberal view rep-
resented by the Greek government and the EU. Covering the
government’s representatives with a key symbol of Greekness
suggests not just a public shaming but a reminder of the social
values represented by traditional Greek food. It is striking that
this message did not need to be elaborated through inter-
17. Two new practices that have sprung up in the wake of the protest:
(1) the self-named Potato Movement, involving farmers selling directly
to buyers, cutting out what they see as rapacious middlemen, and (2)
the establishment of nonmonetary service exchange networks in several
cities and towns across Greece,
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pretation but was well-enough understood that some civil and
religious leaders specifically referred to “yogurting” as a jus-
tified mode of protest. Theodossopoulos makes the interesting
suggestion that there are “ontological differences in the per-
ception of time, personhood, and authority [which] become
apparent in the dissonance of expectations between foreign
technocrats and local—culturally situated—actors.” I believe
that interpretive work of this kind is critical to making sense
of contemporary protest whether in Greece, Occupy Wall
Street, the Arab Spring, or wherever else it may arise to contest
neoliberal policies and regimes.
Vassiliki Yiakoumaki
Department of History-Archaeology-Social Anthropology, Univer-
sity of Thessaly, Argonafton and Filellinon, Volos 382 21, Greece
(yiakoumaki@uth.gr). 10 X 12
Dimitrios Theodossopoulos’s article is very timely in tackling
states of unsettlement among Greeks in its various manifes-
tations as one effect of the current crisis in Europe. The text
is also evidence of a consistent intellectual thread in his work
concerned with emotion and sentiment in a population’s po-
litical culture.
The author is immersing us into the discursive universe of
everyday Greeks experiencing the crisis. He renders the var-
ious nuances of the category “indignant,” thus demystifying
the popular depiction of the “crowd” taking the streets, and
of the Greeks (suddenly) unified in rage or in compassion,
beyond social-class constraints or political party allegiances.
The sweeping categorizations produced by the media obfus-
cate the important details in the picture.
What I will engage in is certain interpretations of this dis-
cursive universe, particularly pertaining to the ideas of resis-
tance and empowerment. Specifically I am referring to the
author’s position on a very common, and popular, set of
utterances, in which we hear the “indignant” Greeks under-
rating the crisis, resorting to conspiracy theories, blaming
outside forces, denouncing Western “ungratefulness” toward
Greece, charging Germans with “harshness,” and so on. The
author dissects these statements thoroughly, to admit that they
are produced by subjects in a state of predicament. I could
not agree more. Crucially he also admits such statements may
be modes of evading responsibility. It is this direction that I
wish he had privileged equally. The author does see the am-
bivalent, passive-aggressive nature of such statements (e.g.,
Greeks simultaneously boasting and self-pitying). He is aware
that statements of professed (Greek) defiance, self-compla-
cency, and embitterment can be the other side of the inner
awareness of the “flaw.” Attributing, blaming, or relegating
can be modes of bypassing the discussion or denying reality.
Therefore, there is also a dark side to the Greek indignation.
Is this a Pandora’s box that the author does not wish to open?
I understand the weight of this responsibility.
This is indeed a dismal moment for the majority of Greek
people. Unsettlement and indignation, however, may mean
disenfranchisement for some, or they may just mean the loss
of excessive power for others (or volema, in the vernacular).
Besides the obvious interpretations, therefore, indignation
may imply desire to maintain established power hierarchies,
due to economic interests. Indignation (with the ksenoi [the
foreigners]) may originate from a sense of never-ending en-
titlement; this indignation, in turn, can be the other side of
submissiveness. All these reflect various pathologies of the
Greek state, particularly since the metapolitefsi (postdictator-
ship period). The latter is, I believe, at the heart of decon-
structing dominant Greek mentalities. It is this aspect of Greek
reality that current analyses of public protest could illuminate
more.18
For the above reasons, I am a little skeptical vis-a`-vis the
author’s main contention about empowerment. I, too, believe
that the moment of indignation, as pursuit of “their own
interpretive trajectories,” can be enabling for the subjects.
However, this is only a momentary gain at the level of emo-
tional well being and not analogous to the dimensions of the
actual problem: it can be crushed on a daily level in the harsh
reality out there. It feels a bit like the “weapons of the weak”
(Scott 1985); it leaves you with a sense of fleeting, thus even-
tually, and bitterly, unattainable victories. Furthermore, once
again we need to make the distinction: for the many disen-
franchised, criticism and indignation can be empowerment,
but for others (the non-“subaltern”) it can be a reaction of
intransigence.
For the same reasons I would hesitate to call it resistance,
at least not in every instance. Provocative statements such as
yes, “Let’s go bankrupt!” are not necessarily “defiant” or “ag-
onistic.” They can be read variably: the informant is entirely
unaware of the social and economic consequences of this; or,
the informant is in a state of destitution, hence has nothing
to lose; or the informant speaks from a position of privilege.
The author is well aware of the shortcomings in the literature
on resistance. Nevertheless, he leaves the reader a little un-
certain as to what his position is. I detect a degree of ad-
miration, or even affection, for indignant subjects, whose very
attitudes he has taken pains to deconstruct.
The author alerts us to the fact that such rhetoric “crosscuts
political affiliations.” I take this as a crucial call for anthro-
pologists to reflect upon the political as it is invoked by many
subjects and collectivities today, that is, beyond “traditional
political alignments.” The author is one of the first contrib-
utors to the so far unexplored area of the crisis in Greece
from the point of view of anthropology. Undoubtedly the
overall impression is of a brave attempt to avoid easy answers
(so common on the topic of the crisis, alas) and to grapple
with the complexity of the situation.
18. For an oft-cited but useful work, see, e.g., Diamandouros 2000 on
the figure of the “underdog.”
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Reply
There are two easily identifiable inclinations in the anthro-
pological analysis of Greek political discourse:19 the first,
which I call “Herzfeldian” (as its prime example is Michael
Herzfeld’s work), makes visible the everyday tactics of local
actors, the cultural etymology of their excuses, and the na-
tionalism (and racism) inherent in Greek unofficial rhetoric.
The second, which I call “Suttonian” (in acknowledgment of
a perspective taken by David Sutton20) engages critically with
the tendency of Western academics to pathologize local Greek
views that challenge Western hegemonic rationality and le-
gality. The two interpretive routes are deeply anthropological
and anti-orientalist, although the second stretches anti-ori-
entalism further (sometimes, at the risk of “absolving”—un-
intentionally—local nationalism); the commentary received
provides an opportunity to explore these two analytic trajec-
tories.
First, however, I would like to thank the commentators for
engaging with the article and extending its interpretative
threads. I strongly believe that an anthropological understand-
ing of the Greek crisis will only emerge through a collaborative
and comparative exercise. For such is the enormity and com-
plexity of the response to the crisis—that any single inter-
pretation will be inherently incomplete. On my part, writing
immediately after the 2011 protest, I had to choose my focus
carefully and make choices regarding the theoretical orien-
tation (e.g., more Herzfeldian and less Suttonian) and the
methodological approach (bottom-up vs. top-down, with
more or less reference to a historical/media context). The
commentary received gives me an opportunity to explain fur-
ther the choices that I made.
In the year that has followed the initial writing of this
article, remarkable developments in Greece (including two
elections) have changed the political landscape: established
political parties have found their support base reduced, while
previously small parties have increased their power dramat-
ically (including a sizable leftist—not social-democratic—op-
position but also one with an explicitly fascist agenda). The
Greek anti-austerity protest has been hijacked by election-
eering politicians from the left, the right, and the extreme
right, while the original spirit of the protest (favoring anti-
structure and direct democracy) has been depoliticized by
“structured” party politics (claiming authority through par-
liamentary representation).
At the local level, as Sutton remarked, networks of food
exchange and redistribution of agricultural produce provided
a sense of social unity against consumerism (and there have
been similar reactions, such as high school teachers tutoring
impoverished students for no charge). Such reassertions of
19. For a more detailed description of these approaches, see Theo-
dossopoulos 2013.
20. See, in particular, Sutton 2003.
the moral community, and the overall defiant rhetoric of all
kinds of “infuriated” Greeks, can be seen as ephemeral vic-
tories, Yiakoumaki suggests, and “weapons of the weak” in
James Scott’s (1985) terms. The limits of resistance—its
ephemerality and functionalization (see Myrivili’s com-
ment)—are now, a year later, easier to notice, as well as the
appropriation of discontent by formal party politics. I very
much agree with Yiakoumaki in that there is also a “dark
side” to Greek indignation: the longing of so many politicians,
union leaders, and journalists (even a few academics) to
mimic the defiance of the protesters so as to defend estab-
lished privileges and blame others, “otherizing” foreign
nations, and “pleasing” (“stroking the ears of,” as the Greeks
say) the discontented public.
In such a highly politicized context, it takes courage to
follow the Herzfeldian direction, as does Yiakoumaki (and
myself in the article), and expose the contradictions—the
many disemias—of anti-austerity rhetoric. Nevertheless, in
this process, we can benefit from the Suttonian approach and
ensure, while deconstructing nationalism and the blaming of
Others, that we do not pathologize as paranoid or “irrational”
the (nationalist, responsibility-evading) local actors, an ana-
lytical trap that Herzfeld has masterfully avoided.
I have to admit that, while writing this article, I felt as
though I was treading a fine line between the trespasses of
orientalizing and idealization. Yiakoumaki detected a certain
“degree of admiration, or even affection, for indignant sub-
jects,” and she is right: in practice, idealization is as hard to
avoid as ethnocentrism; Abu-Lughod (1990) and Ortner
(1995) have forewarned anthropologists about this danger. To
balance my account, I treated with the same affection those
respondents who were “indignant with the indignant,” even
when I did not always share their arguments. The self-critique
of indignation was not absent in unofficial discussions, but
it was not very visible in the media (national and, especially,
international).
I would be very sad to see anthropology following such an
unreflexive course, that is, to idealize (or exoticize) the protest,
reproducing a condemnation or an apology for the “dark side”
of Greek indignation: unconstrained nationalism, anti-im-
migration racism, clientalist unionism (e.g., lobbying for those
privileged bonuses that maintain consumerist lifestyles). The
discourse of the media and many politicians in Greece is a
good example of this “apologetic” trend, which I deliberately
ignored in this article, prioritizing instead a Herzfeldian anal-
ysis that focuses on accountability and the cultural embed-
dedness of the Greek responses.
Yet, I would be equally saddened to see academic analysis
victimizing and orientalizing the Greeks as an undifferentiated
category. “Neoliberalism becomes hegemonic,” as Sutton
boldly admits, “through insinuating itself as the only ‘rational’
solution to contemporary world events.” Following Sutton, I
have challenged such taken-for-granted versions of rationality
before—for example, while writing about conspiracy theories
(see Brown and Theodossopoulos 2000, 2003) and anti-Amer-
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icanism (see Kirtsoglou and Theodossopoulos 2010a,
2010b)—and I would claim that I have indirectly contex-
tualized “rationality” in this article too, although admittedly
not as much as a Suttonian trajectory would permit. There
is a reason I have not developed this trajectory fully: as in
previous periods of crisis, the critique of Western hegemony
in Greece has become a populist feature in the discourse of
leftists but also of rightist and extreme-rightists(!); in the cri-
tique of the latter it inspires not so much a critique of power
but, instead, nationalist agitation and the uncritical blaming
of Others.
I have chosen to provocatively avoid historical contextu-
alization in this article, a decision critically evaluated by many
commentators (Couroucli, Just, Papagaroufali, Kalantzis,
Gledhill, and Myrivili, albeit to different degrees): this was
originally a choice of necessity relating to the word limit.
Nevertheless, as most commentators also recognize, this par-
ticular choice provided a “refreshing” perspective: more space
was devoted to local voices, highlighting complexity but with-
out superimposing on those voices a top-down, singular, un-
ilineal vision of history (e.g., the Theodossopoulos version of
historical causality). I agree with Couroucli, Just, Papagar-
oufali, and Kalantzis that a consideration of the broader so-
ciopolitical context can shed further light on the complexity
of the crisis; for example, as Couroucli points out, mediatized
news and interviews, blogs, books, and articles, inspire the
articulation of local resistance—and such varied mediums of
expression add to the complexity of the response to the crisis.
In the long run, as Papagaroufali points out, it will be
important to acknowledge the intersection of the bottom-up
and the top-down in the analysis of the crisis, a direction for
future research that Gledhill also suggests. Local informants
too, Just adds, are reliant on the very top-down accounts I
have chosen to avoid. Thus, I fully agree with Kalantzis that
a more complete interpretation of the crisis will eventually
emerge by bringing together analyses that focus on both on-
tological distinctiveness (see, e.g., Hirschon 2012) and the
totalizing influence of systemic factors: in fact, such analytic
trajectories mirror the tensions between the two anthropo-
logical perspectives I have outlined at the beginning of this
reply.
Another potential thread of interpretation, which I have
not developed in this article but am exploring in current work,
regards social movement and resistance theory. Such a per-
spective, as Myrivili points out, can offer valuable comparative
perspectives. Yet, the analysis I provide in this article is deeply
rooted and emerges from a close reading of resistance theory,
as Gledhill, a major author in this field, observes. In fact, the
theoretical advantages of pairing the “double consciousness”
of Greek actors—to use Gledhill’s sharp observation—with
Herzfeld’s disemic model can be enormous, and such poten-
tialities have emerged from bottom-up analysis.
Additional topics that I have not touched upon and deserve
further research include the corporeality of dissent, or the
distinction between patriotic/ultraconservative and left-wing
expressions of the protest (e.g., “lower and upper square”) as
Kalantzis aptly observed. The latter distinction has become
more salient, a year after writing this article and with the rise
of fascism (and its rationalization by representational de-
mocracy and electoral success). Apart from the role of the
ultra-right, the issue of class, as Gledhill points out, has also
emerged as a pertinent question, especially with unemploy-
ment among a highly educated, “young” middle class that
was heavily represented in the protest. Such topics beg further
analysis and empirical research.
At the time of writing this article, without foresight of later
developments, I took one of the first interpretive steps in the
anthropological analysis of the Greek crisis.21 I decided to
detract attention from the banal (and nationalist) recycling
of a superficially antihegemonic discourse in Greece, which
victimizes foreigners, exonerates the Self, and aims at the
accumulation of political capital (or privilege). I focused in-
stead on the exegetical strategies of local actors, the voices of
the people affected by the crisis, and I chose to prioritize
anthropological theory written about Greece, as this was de-
veloped in conversation with the particular social context,22
while also believing that the political anthropology of Greece
can inspire analyses beyond geographic boundaries: for ex-
ample, the Herzfeldian and the Suttonian trajectories outlined
above have resonances with crises in other peripheries in the
global distribution of power.
A bottom-up approach, combined with explicit use of the-
oretical ethnography—we should always remember that eth-
nography is a theoretical medium, not a method of data col-
lection—enabled me to underline two important issues: (a)
that local voices are much more complex, diverse, and self-
critical than international and Greek media presented them
to be, and (b) that indignation with the crisis, in its local
complexity and contradictions, generates cultural meaning
that embraces but also denies (and expands beyond) the ra-
tionality of Western economic narratives. In such a transcend-
ing capacity, indignation can be a liberating experience for
the dispossessed, inspiring a discursive empowerment that
may encourage, as time has indicated in Greece, transfor-
mative effects on social and political relations. Thus, I believe,
Greek indignation is not merely a weapon of the weak.
Point a (above), so all commentators acknowledge, con-
tributes to the de-orientalization of the Greek crisis: a serious
departure from the image of the “angry Greek” (see Myrivili,
Papagaroufali), “lazy” Greek (see Just), but also, I would add,
that of the “poor” Greek (eliciting the patronizing, exoticizing
sympathy of Western educated elites). The “aesthetics of ex-
asperation,” as Kalantzis (2012) has demonstrated, can lead
21. A response simultaneously undertaken by others; see Herzfeld
2011, Hirschon 2012, Kalantzis 2012, and the short articles edited by
Papailias and published in “Hot Spots: Beyond the ‘Greek crisis’” (2011).
22. To some significant degree, the contextual embeddedness of the
anthropology of Greece has compensated for the lack of sociohistorical
contextualization in the article, and my particular choice of theory also
attempted to partly remedy the issue of contextualization.
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to such stereotyping and exoticizing. Point b (above) provides
a uniting link between Herzfeld’s attention on accountability
and Sutton’s concern with the pervasiveness of neoliberal ra-
tionality. A purpose of my article—which Myrivili did not
see, but reassuringly the other commentators did—was to take
a first step toward integrating points a and b and the two
analytical trajectories outlined above. And beyond academia,
such a deconstructive step can contribute, through self-cri-
tique, to the greater project of developing a new ideological
platform for the global Left, one that can aid in the resolution
of the crisis.
In the year that has followed last summer’s anti-austerity
protest, the ambivalence of Greek resistance has culminated
in a publically expressed desire to remain in the consumerist
sphere of the euro but without obeying the consumerist ra-
tionality and regulations of the European economy. Disemic
contradictions such as these are very hard for non-Greek
journalists and economists to tackle, yet the anthropological
perspective demonstrates that cultural identities embrace and
flourish under such contradictions.
It is this appreciation of the complexity in anti-austerity
discourse—“anything but uniform,” to use Just’s words—that
has inspired this article and my use of theoretical ethnography
as the medium of analysis: a radical bottom-up perspective,
even if here it is delivered at the expense of context, can shake
the formalistic and static linearity of top-down narratives.
Instead of trying to explain the “total” phenomenon of the
crisis—an unrealistic, if not arrogant, undertaking—social an-
alysts (journalists and politicians too!) would benefit from
appreciating the ambivalence and contradictions of unofficial
views discussed at the local level: everyday actors, discussants
of the ordinary and the extraordinary, in Greece and every-
where, dehomogenize accountability, evade responsibility,
blame others (and also their ethnic Self), reshaping, gradually
but relentlessly, their intimate social worlds. Anthropology
can show us how.
—Dimitrios Theodossopoulos
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